1 ANSWER
The Tractatus is kind of based on the premise that the meaning contained in language can be logically codified. In other words, if we just do enough logic, we can understand language, and it's theoretically possible to come up with a logical representation of any sentence of any language that would accurately reflect the meaning of the sentence and that sentence's correspondence with the world.
The Philosophical Investigations come to the opposite conclusionn. Ludwig loved poetry and religion, and he was troubled by how the Tractatus didn't really provide a lot of help when it came to understanding those things. So, he decided, the Tractatus is basically completely wrong. Language (or, more narrowly, language games) is, instead, a "form of life" that transmutes and changes as it is used. Most (not all) words, have definitions that are constantly changing and depend on the context in which they are used. You can only understand a language if you understand the broader context in which a given use exists. Words don't necessarily have definitions, in other words, outside of the very broad contexts in which they exist.
It all sounds very boring, but it's pretty interesting when you think about the stuff in more detail.
The Philosophical Investigations come to the opposite conclusionn. Ludwig loved poetry and religion, and he was troubled by how the Tractatus didn't really provide a lot of help when it came to understanding those things. So, he decided, the Tractatus is basically completely wrong. Language (or, more narrowly, language games) is, instead, a "form of life" that transmutes and changes as it is used. Most (not all) words, have definitions that are constantly changing and depend on the context in which they are used. You can only understand a language if you understand the broader context in which a given use exists. Words don't necessarily have definitions, in other words, outside of the very broad contexts in which they exist.
It all sounds very boring, but it's pretty interesting when you think about the stuff in more detail.
3 ANSWERS
The interesting thing about Wittgenstein is not "his theory" - it is his mode of avoiding stupid questions by asking other questions.
He is generally interested in why we should ask a certain question, and he expects that we are ready to move into dead ends with our questions.
"Do philosophers discuss things on a meta level?" he thus asks in his last work, On Certainty (written in 1952 published in 1969), right before his death. No, they are rather playing a very limited game among philosophers - a game "normal" people would find weird. Are philosophers strange and abnormal, are they mad? No, not at all. They ask these questions (which only lunatics would seriously ask), because they are part of their special game. Like the two philosophers in a garden. One of them asks: "Is there really a tree right before me?" (Or am I only dreaming this?) A man passes by and is puzzled - how can they doubt that that is a tree over there?! The philosophers see the man and know that he is playing his normal game. They rather assure him that they are quite alright: "We are only philosophising", so their answer - which means: they know the logic of every day life and they know the special logic of the game philosophers can play in order to evaluate statements. Wittgensteins observation is also (in this example): that they assume the normal man will immediately understand their game (though it is no game he wants to play). They are sure he will not call an ambulance now that he has understood, they are only philosophising.
Philosophers before Wittgenstein were inclined to assume that philosophers do the serious thinking and that other people are just superficial and prejudiced. Wittgenstein, on the contrary, assumes that both, philosophers and non-philosophers know both games. The philosopher plays an additional game in special situations of philosophising. "Normal" people have an idea of philosophical questions and options but no real need to invest time in that particular game - a game that is not really of greater importance than the game of normal perspectives.
The thought of the last book is still in line with Wittgenstein's earliest thoughts. The young Witgenstein redefines logic and mathematics as a set of rules and conventions in his first considerations of the Tractatus at the beginning of the 20th century. Logic and mathematics, so his assumption, are not the truth behind all things. Once you take that step you can consider the rules of logic with far more clarity.
Wittgenstein is often confusing to read - in the eyes of people who want "an answer" (on the mysterious question of everything). They try to define his terminology - and do not even realise that he does not use a special terminology or a special theory. He is rather using regular German (and English) language in order to reconsider questions. He has often stated that there is nothing special about his philosophy. Once you dare to understand and reconsider questions with him all his answers become rather trivial - so Wittgenstein in the preface to the Tractatus in 1922.
He is generally interested in why we should ask a certain question, and he expects that we are ready to move into dead ends with our questions.
"Do philosophers discuss things on a meta level?" he thus asks in his last work, On Certainty (written in 1952 published in 1969), right before his death. No, they are rather playing a very limited game among philosophers - a game "normal" people would find weird. Are philosophers strange and abnormal, are they mad? No, not at all. They ask these questions (which only lunatics would seriously ask), because they are part of their special game. Like the two philosophers in a garden. One of them asks: "Is there really a tree right before me?" (Or am I only dreaming this?) A man passes by and is puzzled - how can they doubt that that is a tree over there?! The philosophers see the man and know that he is playing his normal game. They rather assure him that they are quite alright: "We are only philosophising", so their answer - which means: they know the logic of every day life and they know the special logic of the game philosophers can play in order to evaluate statements. Wittgensteins observation is also (in this example): that they assume the normal man will immediately understand their game (though it is no game he wants to play). They are sure he will not call an ambulance now that he has understood, they are only philosophising.
Philosophers before Wittgenstein were inclined to assume that philosophers do the serious thinking and that other people are just superficial and prejudiced. Wittgenstein, on the contrary, assumes that both, philosophers and non-philosophers know both games. The philosopher plays an additional game in special situations of philosophising. "Normal" people have an idea of philosophical questions and options but no real need to invest time in that particular game - a game that is not really of greater importance than the game of normal perspectives.
The thought of the last book is still in line with Wittgenstein's earliest thoughts. The young Witgenstein redefines logic and mathematics as a set of rules and conventions in his first considerations of the Tractatus at the beginning of the 20th century. Logic and mathematics, so his assumption, are not the truth behind all things. Once you take that step you can consider the rules of logic with far more clarity.
Wittgenstein is often confusing to read - in the eyes of people who want "an answer" (on the mysterious question of everything). They try to define his terminology - and do not even realise that he does not use a special terminology or a special theory. He is rather using regular German (and English) language in order to reconsider questions. He has often stated that there is nothing special about his philosophy. Once you dare to understand and reconsider questions with him all his answers become rather trivial - so Wittgenstein in the preface to the Tractatus in 1922.
I'm probably not very precise, but here is my impression of one of Wittgenstein's ideas.
Philosophers and mathematicians were trying to find a fixed starting point to be a basis for logic and mathematics.
They had been at it for a while, and thought they were pretty close. Which I think they kind of were, considering the advancements in logic and mathematics in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Read up on Bertrand Russell for example.
There was just one little thing though, that Wittgenstein came up with in the little hut he built for himself by Sognefjorden in Norway.
There is no fixed starting point. To try to find out what a thing is in it self, is meaningless. The question "what is the meaning of life" is kind of meaningless, because "life" has no meaning in it self.
"Life" only becomes meaningful when it is used in a context. The way I use "life" now is meaningful to you in the real world. One doesn't need to define a word to use it in a meaningful way.
You don't need to find the basis, or starting point of mathematics or logic, to use mathematics and logic in meaningful and practical ways.
This was mind blowing for everyone who understood it. Because, the way I see it, humanity shifted from believing that we have to find a solid base to build our knowledge, beliefs, language, faith, etc. on, to believing that it is better to decide what we think is a good starting point and work from there.
If we, by investigation, see that our starting point might not be as good as we thought, we can adjust the starting point.
And that was a useful way to approach things, because it led to useful discoveries, such as scientific method, computer languages, and many other.
Philosophers and mathematicians were trying to find a fixed starting point to be a basis for logic and mathematics.
They had been at it for a while, and thought they were pretty close. Which I think they kind of were, considering the advancements in logic and mathematics in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Read up on Bertrand Russell for example.
There was just one little thing though, that Wittgenstein came up with in the little hut he built for himself by Sognefjorden in Norway.
There is no fixed starting point. To try to find out what a thing is in it self, is meaningless. The question "what is the meaning of life" is kind of meaningless, because "life" has no meaning in it self.
"Life" only becomes meaningful when it is used in a context. The way I use "life" now is meaningful to you in the real world. One doesn't need to define a word to use it in a meaningful way.
You don't need to find the basis, or starting point of mathematics or logic, to use mathematics and logic in meaningful and practical ways.
This was mind blowing for everyone who understood it. Because, the way I see it, humanity shifted from believing that we have to find a solid base to build our knowledge, beliefs, language, faith, etc. on, to believing that it is better to decide what we think is a good starting point and work from there.
If we, by investigation, see that our starting point might not be as good as we thought, we can adjust the starting point.
And that was a useful way to approach things, because it led to useful discoveries, such as scientific method, computer languages, and many other.
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