Idealism, Materialism, and Uncommon Sense

Idealism and Materialism and Uncommon Sense

For years, I just rejected outright idealism because I thought it was an affront to common sense and "logic". But luckily for me, I always take pride in being intellectually honest---as opposed to some cockeyed guys and gals who fancy that they are "educated" and in the "know" and don't hesitate to let the world know that they are "intellectuals" and widely knowledgeable about many subjects, but when they are confronted about their meager knowledge about a specific area, say, ethology, for instance, they hem and haw and then cope out and run for the hills instead of having an honest, intellectual discussion (I call these guys and gals "intellectual pygmies and cowards". Our words and actions have a way to tell the world our true nature)---and defer to a possibility that my thinking could be off-base or at least needs refinement. I thus don't always possess a confirmation bias. So when I came across a book by Andrew Pessin about Uncommon Sense (Philosophy: Uncommon Sense, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), I took the time to really understand what Berkeley, a proponent of idealism, had to offer. After wading through the ingenious arguments that Berkeley put forth, I would have to say that I am now looking at idealism, though belatedly, with more respect. And I no longer look at theists as a bunch of deluded idiots. That does not mean I have renounced atheism. Atheism still makes more sense to me in the scheme of things, even though it has not been of much help to me to understand the mysteries in this universe as we know it. The following is taken verbatim from a chapter on Berkeley in Pessin's book. I am not smart enough to paraphrase the chapter, although I did change a word here and there. 

Idealism: Esse est percipi: to be is to be perceived. Everything that exists does so only insofar as it is perceived by some mind. This doctrine, that all that exists are minds and their perceptions---more commonly known as ideas, is called idealism. 

Materialism: This thinking orientation espouses that in addition to no physical minds, the universe contains mind-independent, spatially extended physical objects that are perceived indirectly by means of ideas, some of which resemble those objects (such as our perceptions of size, shape, and motion, the primary qualities), and some of which do not (such as our perceptions of color, flavor, and other secondary qualities). What we mean by "indirectly, by means of ideas" is that when we look at a tree, for example, what we perceive isn't the physical tree itself but some mental representation or image (or "idea") of the tree. 

The difference between idealism and materialism is that the former stops at a position that there are only minds and ideas while the latter adds the claim that there are also mind-independent physical objects out there causing those ideas. 

Berkeley thinks that materialism is wrong in almost every way, and he offers three argument to show why. 

Argument 1: Materialism Engenders Skepticism 

Berkeley argues that materialism leaves at least two important things unknowable: the sensible qualities of physical bodies and whether those bodies even exist outside the mind at all. 

To see why Berkeley thinks the existence of physical bodies is unknowable, we must look at the arguments that materialists such as Descartes and Locke make to prove that physical bodies do exist

(1) First, they observe, when we call up mental images from our memories or imagination, they are always faint and occur involuntarily. But when we open our eyes, we involuntarily experience vivid sensory perceptions. The best explanation of this difference is that the former are purely in our minds and that external physical bodies, independent of our minds, cause the latter---in which case they must exist.

(2) Second, they note, it surely seems to us that our preceptions come from external bodies, and God would be deceiving us if in fact they didn't. But God, a perfectly good being, could be no deceiver. So our perceptions must come from external bodies, just as they seem to, and bodies must therefore exist. 

Berkeley objects to these arguments.

The first merely suggests something exists externally to our minds, causing our perceptions, but it doesn't show that these must be physical bodies. The cause of our perceptions could just as well be other no physical minds and/or God himself. So the argument doesn't prove that there's an external physical world, as materialism claims. 

The second argument assumes that our perceptions come from external bodies. But all we ever experience are the perceptions, the ideas, not the bodies themselves. 

Argument 2: Contra the Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities 

Berkeley challenges the distinction in two steps.

(1) First he emphasizes what he shares with the materialists about the view that the secondary qualities are really only in the mind of the perceived and not in the bodies. But then he adds some new arguments. For example, everybody agrees that pain and pleasure exist only as sensations in the perceiver's mind and that they are not properties in bodies themselves. 

(2) Next, Berkeley argues that similar arguments apply to materialism's primary qualities. The arguments have the following general forms:

A perceived quality varies.
The object itself does not vary. 

Consider size. A dust mite appears small to our eyes and its feet even smaller. But the mite's feet would appear to the mite itself as being of moderate size and would appear as even larger to any creatures smaller than the mite. While the perceived quality (size) is varying between perceivers, the alleged body itself, the mite's feet, is not varying. So the "primary quality" of size is, after all, in the mind of the perceiver.

Argument 3: The Inconceivability Argument

Berkeley maintains that materialism is not merely false, it's logically contradictory. To say that something is "logically possible" is to say that it may be conceived without contradiction. But, according to Berkeley, the act of conceiving some tree, for example, ensures that it is in some mind, namely yours. To say that you are conceiving of some object existing outside of all minds is to say that you have in your mind an object outside all minds: a clear contradiction.

In the following Berkeley provides an additional argument in support of idealism. The argument has four steps. 

(1) Sensible Qualities Are by Their Nature Perceived 

Sodium chloride has its molecular structure even when no minds are around but that salty flavor or structure exists only when some sentient being, preferably human, is tasting it. 

(2) Thus, Sensible Qualities Are Perceived Directly

Perceiving "directly" contrasts with "inferring": we hear a sound directly but only infer that there is a car out there causing the sound. But now, if sensible qualities were perceived indirectly---that is, only inferred to exist and not directly perceived---then they would in fact exist while being themselves unperceived. But then by step 1 above, it has been argued that sensible qualities only exist when being perceived. It therefore follows that we cannot perceive them indirectly, in which case we must conclude that they are perceived directly.

(3) Bodies Are Just Bundles of Sensible Qualities

There are, in philosophy, two major competing views about the relationship between a given object (say, an apple) and its properties. On the first, an apple is just its bundle of properties: roundness, sweetness, moistness, and so on. On the second view, held at least by the materialist Locke, an apple is something distinct from its properties. It is the "thing" that has those properties. This "thing" is called a substratum (something lying beneath). It is what "lies beneath" the roundness, sweetness, and so on.

Bradley endorses the first view. He offers various arguments, but the most important is perhaps the skeptical concern Argument 1. Properties such as "roundness, sweetness," and so on, we can observe with our senses, but once you insist that the substratum is distinct from those sensible qualities, then it becomes something we are incapable of sensing. Thus we can never confirm its reality: it becomes unknowable.

It's better, therefore, to reject the substratum view and hold instead that a given body is nothing more than a bundle of sensible properties. 

(4) Thus, Bodies Are by Their Nature Perceived, and Perceived Directly

This conclusion follows directly from the previous steps. To say that is to say everything that exists does so only insofar as it is being perceived, that is, insofar as it exists within a mind. So there is no mind-independent physical world after all. What we previously took to be "bodies" are just bundles of perceptions, existing within minds---and minds and their perceptions are all that really exists. 

Uncommon Sense?

We've got our idealism. But for many people, idealism crosses the line of believability when it denies the existence of the physical universe and claims that everything exists in our minds. It appears that idealism violates common sense too violently to be accepted. Instead of insisting that sometimes good arguments must override common sense, Berkeley suggests that in comparison to materialism, idealism itself better fits common sense. 

Here's how:

If you ask precisely what common sense actually believes about certain relevant things, you may want to do a quick survey and ask various normal people (no philosophers, no psychotics, no idiots) the following questions:

Do you perceive bodies directly?
Do you believe the world is fundamentally unknowable?
Is fire hot?

Most will likely answer yes, no, and yes.

Then think about how materialism answers these questions.

Materialism's physical bodies are perceived only indirectly. 
The substratum "lying beneath" a body's properties can never be perceived and is thus unknowable. 
And, finally, according to materialism, fire is some physical object "out there"' while "heat" is a secondary quality existing only in the mind. So, strictly speaking, the fire is not itself hot but merely causes heat sensations in us.

In other words, the answers supplied by materialism are no, yes, and no. Not much of a fit with common sense.

How would idealism fare here?

A body, according to idealism, is just a bundle of sensory perceptions and is therefore perceived directly.

Since all that exists is what is perceivable, there is nothing left over to the world that could be unknowable in any way.

And since the object "fire" is itself just a bundle of sensory perceptions, including heat, then the fire itself is indeed hot.

So, the answers are yes, no, and yes, respectively. 

Note:

I showed the above to Omar Sabat, my best friend who is also an assassin par excellence cum poker player cum fiction writer and poet. I was expecting some acknowledgement from him for my search for "realities". Instead, he laughed his head off after quickly reading it. 

-Tell me, Roberto, what were you trying to do with these notes?
-Come on, man, I thought you knew why.
-No, I didn't. Tell me.
-Point number one: you see, I am a person torn between fantasies and realities. I indulge in fantasies when I write poems and short stories, although they have basis on factualities. The notes serve a direct connection to realities. I want to have my beliefs and thinking based on sound intellectual foundation, not wishful thinking, not hackneyed and cockeyed propaganda trash and relentless indoctrination. I am a man, not a parrot. I want to live in facts, truths, and "logic". I may occasionally take excursions in the land of fantasies, but those trips strictly are for entertainment. They are not the end all and be all of my existence, like what I see they serve to human monkeys and chimps. A real human must respect realities, not only of the world but also of himself. Denial is for cowards. I have seen so many so-called college graduates resort to cheap tactics and cheap ad hominem attacks and vulgar language just to irritate the opponents in a debate after they failed to demolish the arguments put forth by their interlocutors. These cowards couldn't admit they were losers in a debate. They had ego, not pride. Yes, I despise them from the core of my being. I consider them half-baked humans and full-fledged animals. You see, I am different from them. If you point out to me I am factually wrong or logically deficient in my argument(s), I would gladly thank you because I have learned something from you. I post what I have written on the Internet because primarily I issue a challenge and a dare. I welcome legitimate attacks and comments. I don't really look for agreements and praise because I learn nothing from agreements and praise. 

Point number two: a linguistically impaired dude once mocked me publicly for writing love poetry even though I am in my 60's. How stupid the dude was! Love has no age limitations. Just because the dude is hideously ugly and no woman in her right mind would want to go out with him, that does not mean other men would suffer the same fate as he does. I am a handsome and fit and charming and funny man. I attract women. And I like women. Given my looks, romantic disposition, poetic sensibilities, and linguistic endowment, naturally I find that writing love poetry is a matter of course. Doesn't the dude know that being found attractive by the opposite sex is one of the nicest, most peaceful and most life-affirming feelings a man can have? You see, that cheap shot at me by the dude made me realize that he, like so many others, can't think straight. The notes I just showed you indicated that real thinking is hard work. I had to give Berkeley credit for being clever. I sensed that there were some elements of sophistry somewhere in his arguments, but I am not smart enough to spot them. I was hoping you would point them out to me. Instead, you laughed like a hyena. You really disappointed me.

-Roberto, before you conclude that Berkeley's arguments are full of sophistry, you need to look into the writings of Thomas Nagel and David Chalmers. These two individuals rejected emergentism. Reality can be stranger than you think, if you are willing to dig deeper. At any rate, didn't you tell me at one time that you love words, ideas, truth and justice, and women in the ascending order? You may want to reexamine the order. I have no problem with the beliefs of any person, no matter how misguided and stupid they are, as long as the beliefs are passionate and sincere and based on well thought-out reasoning, and not a result of unquestioning parrot learning and relentless propaganda and indoctrination. Too often, a Vietnamese Catholic or a Buddhist fails to give me cogent, credible, logical, "scientific" (i.e., verifiable) reasons for his faith. That failure, to me, smacks and smells of infantilism and intellectual slavery and lack of independent, adult thinking. There is nothing more tragic for a functioning human to willingly enter into a prison of ignorance and stupidity and yet ironically "thinks" there is nothing wrong with such a choice. 

Wissai
March 15, 2014