Sunday, April 2, 2017

FoucaultbyJeremyArnoldinQuora

Some years ago, I shared a class with a first-year philosophy student whose paper was handed back by the professor with the following comment:

"You may be the smartest student in the school — or perhaps the biggest bullshit artist. Sometimes it's hard to tell the two apart."

One might say the same of Foucault. Though unquestionably brilliant, he was a complicated individual: equal parts scholar, madman, prophet, and gadfly.

While his body of work is beyond my powers to do justice to, I'll share a few broad insights that have helped me approach his work with more appreciation and clarity.

To distinguish between his competing aspects takes no small amount of time. My only hope is to convince you it’s a worthy investment.


Biographical Context

To understand Foucault, we need to understand two men who came before him: Hegel and Nietzsche.

Of the former, he said:

...to escape Hegel involves an exact appreciation of the price we have to pay to detach ourselves from him. It assumes that we are aware of the extent to which Hegel, insidiously perhaps, is close to us; it implies a knowledge, in that which permits us to think against Hegel, of that which remains Hegelian. We have to determine the extent to which our anti-Hegelianism is possibly one of his tricks directed against us, at the end of which he stands, motionless, waiting for us. [1]

Hegelian philosophy (outside our scope here) had formed the ground on which Foucault first stood and viewed the world. The challenge was that this influence left him unsure of his own authentic originality.

This was a significant problem to Foucault, as the golden thread that unified his own work was his study of influence and power. He was possessed by a conviction that these forces shaped people to be other than they would be of their own accord.

At heart, he wanted his readers to understand how insidious this all was. He sought to teach them how to open their eyes to the influence of these dynamics on their identity, thoughts, and relationships.

In this sense, he was a father of modern social justice. It wasn't enough to him that you wept over abuses of privilege and power; you had to consider that the mere existence of asymmetric privilege and power relationships inevitably led to abuse.

Foucault saw potential dangers around every corner, the worst of which was the unexamined life. He preached constant, systematic vigilance.

His advice to his students:

A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought our accepted practices rest. [2]

Another person once wrote that, "if you can't be free, be as free as you can." That could very well have been Foucault's mantra as applied to intellectual independence.

It could have also have belonged to Nietzsche, who I see as somewhat of his historical alter-ego. Just consider how Foucault describes their first encounter of minds:

Nietzsche was a revelation to me. I felt that here was someone quite different from what I had been taught. I read him with a great passion, and I then broke with my life, left my job in the asylum, left France. I had the feeling I had been trapped. Through Nietzsche, I had become a stranger to all that. [3]

And so it was that Foucault followed Nietzsche down the rabbit-hole. In both cases, their conclusions were contrarian, nuanced, and complicated. But, be that as it may, both had keen awareness of some very deep, very real human problems.

Let's look at those problems, as described in four of Foucault’s most popular books:

(To declare my bias, my textual analysis is highly informed by my read on Foucault as a person. I see that narrative everywhere in the text. I can't help it. As such, I'd recommend you read others insights to balance mine.)


Book #1: Madness & Civilization

This was both his first book and his most personal. Ostensibly a history of the treatment of madness in mid-to-late European history, deeper down it's also a study of the rationality of madness (as opposed to the irrationality of institutional reason).

In a fitting line, GK Chesterton once said that, "A madman is not someone who has lost his reason, but someone who has lost everything but his reason."

Foucault saw madness as something distinct from true mental illness. In his way of thinking, the latter occurred once reason had been "diseased"; whereas madness was the result of reason being "dazzled".

You might say that madmen, in his view, were sometimes enlightened souls who had finally seen through the veneer of man's social constructs, just as the escapee from Plato's cave had finally seen the true light of the sun and was dazzled by it.

There's a bit of existentialism about all that. The madman, realizing that men are living constructed lives, now bears the debilitating weight of deciding what a man should be. If he is to return to live among society, to what degree can he still play by its rules? Can he even make himself see things as he once did? Ought he?

Foucault described this man as "a prisoner in the midst of the most free and the most open of roads, chained solidly to an infinite crossroads."

(For context, see: What is the meaning of existential angst?)


Book #2: The Order of Things

The primary topic of this outing was "an archaeology of the human sciences". In it, he hypothesized that in each era of scientific development certain conditions existed that framed, allowed, and encouraged certain discoveries to take place. He called this set of conditions an “episteme”.

It was similar to Kuhn’s concept of a scientific paradigm, except broader. While a paradigm represented a collection of known fundamentals and principles, an episteme was more like the structural and unspoken cultural framework that surrounded that paradigm.

While debate rages as to the legitimacy of epistemes as an historical hermeneutic, they remain an interesting thought experiment and they help to bond several of Foucault’s other ideas more neatly.


Book #3: Discipline and Punish

This takes us back to the core idea of power. He traces the modern history of punishment as it shifted from external shows of retributive justice (like public executions) to the present-day penal system.

The book is complicated and has a “big brother” vibe. Foucault seemed to regret some of the excesses in tone in later years. But it did introduce some searching questions:

  • Did prisons accomplish a meaningful purpose?
  • Were they centered on justice or the exercise of power?
  • Did they improve society or just perpetuate incarceration?

While some of his specifics have been debated and debunked, those questions are still very much present in modern inquiry.


Book #4: The History of Sexuality

This was his final work, which he died before completing. It was highly personal, not just on account of his own sexuality, but because it centered on a subject that he saw connected to truth and identity at the deepest levels.

Bearing in mind his over-arching thesis that power often influences what a person's normal behavior would otherwise be, this was his quest to review the historical record to seek insights on how the concept of individual sexual expression had changed over time as various powers held influence over it.

His first observation was that the then-modern theory of Victorian prudishness wasn't quite right. He found the opposite: that a bourgeoisie class had developed who spent a great deal of their free time thinking and asking about sexuality in a raw way.

Having reviewed their confessions, and having traced back the history of sexuality as far as Greco-Roman times, he reached the ultimate conclusion that sex shouldn't be seen just in terms of "sensation and pleasure" or "law and interdiction", but also in terms of "the true and false".

He suggested that, given sufficient freedom in both the legal and cultural sense, people would figure out who they truly were, and that said freedom was good.


Summary

At the heart of it all, he simply demanded that his readers and students not allow ignorance to poison them, but rather vigorously pursue enlightened resistance:

"I set out to grasp the mechanisms of the effective exercise of power; and I do this because those who are inserted in these relations of power, who are implicated therein, may, through their actions, their resistance, and their rebellion, escape them, transform them—in short, no longer submit to them. And if I do not say what ought to be done, it is not because I believe there is nothing to be done. Quite on the contrary, I think there are a thousand things to be done, to be invented, to be forged, by those who, recognizing the relations of power in which they are implicated, have decided to resist or escape them.” [4]

In specifics, he was a study of contrasts and contradictions — an original thinker who lived in the shadows of great men; a scholar known for breadth of research who many accused of insufficient depth and balance.

But though he may have been an iconoclast and likely a bit mad, he was indisputably an optimist and a humanist.

His theories may have had their holes, but from those holes poured forth hope.


Footnotes:

1. Discourse on Language, Inaugural Lecture at the College de France, 1970-1971. tr. A. M. Sheridan Smith
2. “Practicing criticism, or, is it really important to think?”,interview by Didier Eribon, May 30-31, 1981, in Politics, Philosophy, Culture, ed. L. Kriztman (1988), p. 155
3. Truth, Power, Self : An Interview with Michel Foucault (25 October 1982)
4. Dits et Écrits 1954–1988 (1976) Vol. II, 1976–1988 edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald, p. 911-912

WhyIsNietzscheLiberating?

How can Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy be liberating?
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7 ANSWERS
William Small
Like the existentialists, Nietzsche believed that the world contains no inherent meaning or purpose.  Even if God existed, religion has ceased to offer a coherent and justifiable view of the cosmos - this is what Nietzsche really meant when he famously wrote that God is dead; we can no longer be satisfied with religious justifications for the horror and meaninglessness of the universe.

Unlike the later existentialists, Nietzsche saw this state of affairs as profoundly liberating, rather than terrifying.  The world contains no meaning of its own, so it is up to us.  Meaning is not out there somewhere, waiting to be found; it is in us somewhere, waiting to be created.  At least, it is in a few of us - the 'higher men', or the 'free spirits', or the 'new philosophers', to use Nietzsche's various terms.

This doesn't mean that we should all go out and act on whatever impulses occur to us.  Only the higher men have any values worth creating, and it is a long and hard process which requires tremendous discipline.  Nonetheless, for those who feel lost and adrift in the uncertainties of the world, Nietzsche's philosophy can be profoundly helpful.
I find it liberating for several reasons.

First, Nietzsche writes so well. Sometimes, when I feel in need of beauty, or I need someone to talk to, I open up one of his books, and the writing either flares up in a dramatic speech or sings in musical tonality. The depth, the passion, the beauty, it's wonderful.

Second, I believe that he talks to each of us personally. Disclaimer: I've never met another person as deeply in love with his works as me. I come to this conclusion through countless conversations with people. They express their ideas, and I think to myself, 'Nietzsche said that.' Sometimes, I'll have a full conversation with a friend and I'll come home, open up Zarathustra, and find the same conversation. And his insights! I think all of us have experienced many of the things he talks about. "Anyone who, in intercourse with men, does not occasionally glisten in all colors of distress, green and gray with disgust, satiety, sympathy, gloominess, and loneliness, is certainly not a man of elevated tastes." 

Finally, and this has been touched on, it's liberating because he comes to the conclusion that, even though life is meaningless, you can still make your own meaning. And that, I think, is one of the most liberating ideas I have ever heard. It states that you are in control of your own destiny. It states that you have a responsibility to yourself. It frees you from trying to take upon yourself someone else's meaning--it encourages you to do otherwise.
It can be a liberating philosophy in the sense that it removes the greatest burden of guilt, penance and sin from your shoulders. Also, by disparaging the very concept of Free Will it establishes the true nature of the concept, which is to evoke guilt in humans.  Once, human being realise that the end, the God, is dead, he would no longer be held  by anything, he would become as free as he is in true sense, but doesn't that mean, he would go mad with its own possibilities of being? Sure he could, and Netizsche doesn't deny it, ( he himself went mad , though not exactly for the same reason), but he says that in his going under, he would discover that he will be re-born as a child, and that is the liberation. He would no longer be the human bound by the set of values and passions of herds, but that of his own, and thus he would be the torch bearer to the superman ( both in himself ,and by surpassing his own self for the world).

Also, Neitzsche's concept of Eternal Recurrence, expounds the true state of liberation.

He wants the humans to do a thought experiment in their loneliest of loneliness, that of imagining a Demon, telling the huaman, that all the life that it has lived upto now, all its pain and joy, and the demon himself, would repeat itself numerous times in its  numerous recurring  lives, in  the very same manner and order. That there is no escape from that. What would be the human response to that? Will he shout in agony over the Demon, or will it thank him for the realization that would dawn upon him?

This is a liberating thought. What if , we are bound to repeat ourselves numerous times, in the same manner, over and over again. Shouldn't we then, in the present cycle ( oblivious of the fact ,whether this is our first or repeating cycle), strive to live in a way as we would want to live again and again, in numerous cycles. Shouldn't we then "love" this earthly self of ours and be completely our self and thus transcend it , and go beyond our self , so that we pave the path to the uberman in our self.
Andrea Murphy
How can it not be liberating? In a world where people follow all the rules and do as they're told, Nietzsche reminds us that it is we who must make the rules and if we do not we follow rules set out for us by someone else. It is our responsibility to understand the rules we make and the rules we follow. Nietzsche feels we must never follow the path of others (he uses Christian dogma as an example of this) but should instead forge our own system of ethics, thereby creating our own lives as we feel we ought to live them. 

A wonderful part of Nietzsche's philosophy is his idea of the recurring demon. He asks, if a demon of time were to arrive to you one night and tell you that he would sentence you to repeat all of your lived days eternally, over and over again, would you be happy or sad? This is one of the most useful thought experiments I have ever read where I felt I could genuinely apply it to my life and be the better and the freer for it.
To speak of just one facet of his philosophy: the doctrine of eternal recurrence.

From one perspective, it commands a person to be able to say, "If my life recurs, I will that my life shall play out in exactly the same way, till eternity." Same situation of birth, same personality, experiences, character flaws, desires, mistakes. To say, despite knowing the good/bad consequences, "I want to make the same choices all over again."

The strength of mind required to say this with pure sincerity and full awareness of the the implications -- can you see it? And with such strength comes liberation from the past and freedom for the future.
Christopher Rubin
One faces the terrific heights + nadirs of freedom whilst in the maelstrom of creation-destruction as idealized in the Apollonian-Dionysian movement which  yields both a means of living with truth + epitomizes becoming or the eternal return. For Sartre, it takes the form of nausea (however one wants to interpret that).
Dan Bristol
You can read a lengthy dissertation that serves only to confuse and to promote its author, or you can read this:
 
If existence is devoid of meaning, then we are free to create meaning. Class dismissed. And the question, too!

Saturday, April 1, 2017

StrangePersistenceofGuilt

In 1981 the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre opened his book “After Virtue” with a passage that is now famous. Imagine if we lost the theoretical coherence of science. Imagine if we still used scientific words like neutrino and atomic weight, but had no overall framework to explain how they fit together.

That’s the state of our moral discourse today, he suggested. We still use words describing virtue and vice, but without any overall metaphysics. Religious frameworks no longer organize public debate. Secular philosophies that grew out of the Enlightenment have fallen apart. We have words and emotional instincts about what feels right and wrong, but no settled criteria to help us think, argue and decide.

That diagnosis seemed accurate to many people, and it seemed to point toward a culture of easygoing relativism. With no common criteria by which to judge moral action we’d all become blandly nonjudgmental — sort of chill, pluralistic versions of Snoop Dogg: You do you and I’ll do me and we’ll all be cool about it. Whatever feels right.

But that’s not what’s happened. We haven’t entered the age of milquetoast bourgeois relativism. Instead, society has become a free-form demolition derby of moral confrontation: the cold-eyed fanaticism of students at Middlebury College and other campuses nationwide; the rage of the alt-right; holy wars over transgender bathrooms; the furious intensity at every town-hall meeting on every subject.

American life has secularized and grand political ideologies have fallen away, but moral conflict has only grown. In fact, it’s the people who go to church least — like the members of the alt-right — who seem the most fervent moral crusaders.

We’re living in an age of great moral pressure, even if we lack the words to articulate it. In fact, as Wilfred McClay points out in a brilliant essay called “The Strange Persistence of Guilt” for The Hedgehog Review, religion may be in retreat, but guilt seems as powerfully present as ever.

Technology gives us power and power entails responsibility, and responsibility, McClay notes, leads to guilt: You and I see a picture of a starving child in Sudan and we know inwardly that we’re not doing enough.

“Whatever donation I make to a charitable organization, it can never be as much as I could have given. I can never diminish my carbon footprint enough, or give to the poor enough. … Colonialism, slavery, structural poverty, water pollution, deforestation — there’s an endless list of items for which you and I can take the rap.”

McClay is describing a world in which we’re still driven by an inextinguishable need to feel morally justified. Our thinking is still vestigially shaped by religious categories.

And yet we have no clear framework or set of rituals to guide us in our quest for goodness. Worse, people have a sense of guilt and sin, but no longer a sense that they live in a loving universe marked by divine mercy, grace and forgiveness. There is sin but no formula for redemption.

The only reliable way to feel morally justified in that culture is to assume the role of victim. As McClay puts it, “Claiming victim status is the sole sure means left of absolving oneself and securing one’s sense of fundamental moral innocence.”

“If one wishes to be accounted innocent, one must find a way to make the claim that one cannot be held morally responsible. This is precisely what the status of victimhood accomplishes.”

I’d add that this move takes all moral striving and it politicizes it. Instead of seeing moral struggle as something between you and God (the religious version) or as something that happens between the good and evil within yourself (the classical version), moral struggle now happens primarily between groups.

We see events through the lens of moral Marxism, as a class or ethnic struggle between the evil oppressor and the supposedly innocent oppressed. The moral narrative of colonialism is applied to every situation. The concept of inherited sin is back in common currency, only these days we call it “privilege.”

As the political scientist Thomas U. Berger put it, “We live in an age of apology and recrimination.” The conflicts on campus take on a Salem witch trial intensity. In the Middle East, the Israelis and the Palestinians compete for the victimhood narrative. Even America’s heartland populists see themselves as the victims of the oppressive coastal elites. Steve Bannon is the Frantz Fanon of the whites.

Sin is a stain, a weight and a debt. But at least religions offer people a path from self-reflection and confession to atonement and absolution. Mainstream culture has no clear path upward from guilt, either for individuals or groups. So you get a buildup of scapegoating, shaming and Manichaean condemnation. “This is surely a moral crisis in the making,” McClay writes.

I notice some schools and prisons have restorative justice programs to welcome offenders back into the community. They tend to be more substantive than the cheap grace of instant forgiveness. I wonder if the wider society needs procedures like that, so the private guilt everybody feels isn’t transmuted into a public state of perpetual moral war.

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